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Corruption’s and Democracy’s effects on Economic Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Economists have a long argue that political process such as democracy and corruption are 
important for economic growth. Our objective in this paper is to demonstrate that one of 
democracy's indirect posititive effects is its ability to mitigate the negative effect of corruption 
on economic growth. Although most democratic countries in our sample have a high level of 
corruption, the electoral mechanism inhibits leaders from engaging in acts of corruption that 
cause damage to economic performance and thus jeopardize their political survival. Utilizing 
a dynamic panel data approach for more than 40 countries over the period 2000- 2011, the 
results show that in democratic countries, corruption has no significant effect on economic 
growth, while the non-democratic countries suffer the negative effects of corruption that 
retard economic growth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of the relationship between economic growth and liberal democracy has 
attracted the interest of many economists since the end of World War II. These studies have 
shown that democracy acts positively on economic growth because it facilitates wealth 
(Lipset (1959), Rodrik (2002)). These studies suggest that there is a close relationship 
between wealth and democracy suggesting that democracy is more likely to occur in an 
industrialized society where wealth is generated by a large number of industrial producers. 
 
Other economists have shown through their empirical results that democracy may not 
have a direct relationship to economic growth: the statistic effect of democracy may be 
insignificant. This allows us to think that democracy can have indirect positive effects on 
economic growth. Indeed, democracy has beneficial effects on other variables as political 
stability and education spending. 
We have chosen to explain the indirect effect of democracy on economic growth through 
political corruption that exists in all systems but to different degrees. The aim is to show that 
democracy can mitigate the negative effects of corruption on economic growth. It argues that 
democracy through the electoral mechanism allows citizens to expel politicians who engage 
in particularly harmful forms of corruption. To do this, we use the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation techniques of Arellano and Bond using a dynamic panel on a 
sample of more than 40 democratic and non-democratic countries (see list of countries in 
Annex I) on the period 2000 to 2011. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 exposes a literature review on the 
effect of corruption and democracy on economic growth. Section 3 exposes an empirical 
study on the role of democracy in determining the impact of corruption on economic growth. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we present a review of the literature on the impact of corruption on 
economic growth, and explain later how democracy can enhance these effects. 
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2.1 The impact of corruption on economic growth 
The World Bank defines corruption as "the abuse of public power to obtain private 
advantage." This definition suggests that corruption comes only from public sector 
employees. Another definition of corruption has been proposed by the Council of Europe: 
"corruption includes acts involving persons vested with public or private who violate their 
rights under their quality of public official, private employee, independent agent or other such 
relationship, to obtain illegal benefits either for themselves or for others". According to this 
definition, corruption comes from both the public and private sector. 
 
The relationship between corruption and economic growth has been the subject of 
controversy among economists for many years. And two schools of thought exist. While some 
economists (Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mo (2001)) argue through their 
empirical results that corruption can affect economic growth through its negative effects, 
others argue on the contrary that corruption has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Mauro (1995) conducted an empirical study on the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth and argues that there is a statistically negative effect of corruption on 
private investment rates. This author argues that the cause of low investment is primarily due 
to institutional inefficiency: the main channel is through which bad institutions. 
 Knack and Keefer (1995) also analyzed the impact of corruption on economic growth, adding 
other indicators such as the performance of the bureaucracy, voice and accountability and 
security of property rights. The authors use the variable in the institutional quality of services 
provided by the political risk (Political Risk Services) as a proxy for corruption. Their results 
show that this variable has a negative effect on economic growth. 
Mo (2001) conducted an empirical study to analyze the impact of corruption on economic 
growth and the importance of the transmission channels. He found that the increase in 
corruption leads to lower economic growth. This author has shown that political instability is 
one of the most important channels through which corruption can affect economic growth. 
The results of this author also show that corruption reduces the level of human capital and the 
share of private investment.  
The results of Isse and Abdiweli (2003) also show the negative and statistically significant 
effect of corruption on economic growth, the level of education, the legal effectiveness and 
economic freedom. 
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On the contrary of the economists who argue that corruption has negative effects on 
economic growth, Leff (1964), Huntington (1968) and Lui (1985) argue that corruption has a 
positive effect on economic growth: corruption and essentially "the speed money "can 
increase the efficiency of the economic system. The government will work better or faster 
with the "speed" money that will help reduce transaction costs and avoid delays and 
bureaucratic delays. 
According to Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), allowing individuals to pay bribes to 
public officials in order to avoid inefficient rules and bureaucratic delays, corruption enhances 
economic growth. According to these authors, in some developing countries, "corruption is 
necessary to get things done." If reducing corruption is not associated with changes that 
include the elimination of ineffective rules, the business activity and economic growth could 
slow.  
Corruption acts as a "piece of compensation for bureaucrats which indicates a more 
efficient provision of government services and provides margin of maneuver for entrepreneurs 
to bypass the ineffective regulations", which improves the efficiency of an economy.  
Lui (1985 ) shows that corruption can reduce the waiting time. Bureaucratic delays can 
impede business training. Bypassing the rules ineffective, corrupt officials can take to 
improve growth. Sometimes positive levels of corruption contribute to improve growth in 
countries with relatively effective rules. According Wedeman (1997), the assumption that 
corruption systematically reduced growth is not entirely justified. Indeed, many corrupt 
countries have growth rates high. 
 
In what follows, we present a brief literature discussing the effect of democracy on 
economic growth. democracy has direct effect on economic growth but also indirect benefit 
on economic performance by mitigating corruption's negative effect on an economy.  
 
2.2 The impact of democracy on economic growth 
Democracy has beneficial effects both political and economic. Democratic institutions 
have roles to control government power and limiting behavior of rent-seeking or intended to 
introduce unpopular policies. Among the benefits of democracy is that it allows the expulsion 
of bad leaders.  
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North (1990) argues that authoritarian elites attack less constrained by institutions of 
democratic societies. Bueno de Mesquita and al. (2001) support the idea that authoritarian 
leaders have few checks on their power and therefore engage in cronyism and corruption. 
 Lipset (1959) argues that there is a close relationship between wealth and democracy. 
He suggests that democracy is more likely to occur in an industrialized society where wealth 
is generated by a large number of industrial producers. The middle class maintains a strong 
participation in a system that provides freedom of political and economic choices sufficient to 
enable the creation of more wealth. 
According to Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), the extension and protection of fundamental 
freedoms are considered to generate the security expectations needed to motivate people to 
work, to save and to invest. In addition, the popular political participation has not only 
resulted in breaking the vested interests and privileges of a few, but also involves a 
participatory mentality which greatly increases the flow of information that is essential for 
effective and efficient government. Political pluralism acts to liberate the energies and 
reception conditions favorable to change and for economic development. 
Clague, Keefer and Knack (1996), showed that democracy provides greater safety and 
security to implement property rights than authoritarian regimes. But the benefits of 
democracy do not appear in the short term. Property rights are weak when democracy is 
experiencing a short duration: democracy long (rooted) generates better guarantees for the 
implementation of property rights. 
According to Rodrik (1999), democratic institutions, an independent and effective 
judiciary, and a good non-corrupt bureaucracy are the institutions to better manage social 
conflicts distribution. 
 Rodrik (2000) has provided empirical evidence that:  
- Democracy reduces volatility and leads to higher rates of growth in the long term.  
- Democracy produces better stability in the short term which means that regardless of the 
level of long-term growth of an economy, there is less volatility in economic performance 
under democratic than authoritarian regimes. 
- Democracy allows an economy to face with adverse shocks: indicating that political 
participation enhances the ability of an economy to adapt to changes in the external 
environment. 
 - Democracy allows better distribution. 
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"Taken together, these results provide a clear message: participatory political regimes 
generate growth higher quality".
1
 
Other authors such as Huntington and Nelson (1976) suggest that democracy can hamper 
economic growth, they argue that in the case of newly democratic developing countries, 
citizens' demands will rapidly escalate due to increased government spending. According to 
these authors, political participation must be rooted in order to promote economic growth. 
Other empirical studies have shown that democracy can not have a statistically significant 
direct effect on economic growth. Referring to the work of Helliwell (1994), Przeworski and 
al. (2000), Drury and al.  (2006), these authors concluded that the inexistence of a statistically 
significant effect of democracy on economic growth. This has allowed researchers to examine 
the indirect beneficial effects of democracy on growth, for example through increased 
spending on education and health which themselves contribute to economic growth (Helliwell 
(1994), Drury and (2006) al., Baum et al. (2003)). Another channel through which democracy 
positively affects economic growth is political stability. It is recognized that by facilitating the 
establishment of political stability, growth improves. Corruption can also be an important 
channel through which democracy positively affects economic growth by  mitigating the 
negative effects on growth. North (1990), Bueno de Masquita andal. (2001) argue that in 
democratic regimes, citizens can eliminate corrupt politicians and facilitate growth. This 
ability to punish elected is a powerful incentive for politicians to confine their activities to 
corruption economically relevant activities. However, in authoritarian regimes, it is relatively 
difficult to exclude authoritarian leaders who will not suffer retaliation from society leading to 
extremely expensive forms of corruption. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION RESULTS       
This section tries to demonstrate if democracy can mitigate the negative effects of the 
corruption on economic growth. It presents the model and outlines the measures and data used 
in this empirical study. We also interprets the estimation results. 
3.1.Data 
We use data of more than 40 countries for 12 years (2000-2011). Summary statistics 
for the data appear in Table 1. Our dependent variable, Real GDP (in logarithm), data are 
taken from the World Development indicators (2012).  
                                                          
1 Rodrik D., (2002), « Institutions for high-quality Growth: What they are and how to acquire them». NBER WP, 
N° 7540. 
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Data of corruption index are obtained from Transparency International (2012). This 
variable varies from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). According to data collected, the 
least corrupt countries in our sample are those with score near 10. We can cite, for example, 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, New Zeland and Sweden. While 
most corrupt countries are those with a score neat to o zero, we can cite the case of Algeria, 
Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and Pakistan. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for democratic and non democratic countries 
Variables Mean Standard deviation     
Deviation 
Maximum  Minimum 
     
GDP 25.553 2.013 
 
30.235 
 
21.278 
Corruption index 5.212     2.618       
 
10 
 
0.72          
Life expectancy  
( 
(in log) 
4.267     0.152  4.418 3.758    
Trade openness 
(in log) 
4.312      
 
0.515  5.834 3.100   
InitialGDP/capita 
(in log) 
8.853      1.697    11.189 5.680 
Primary school 
(in log) 
 
 
 
4.591      
 
0.294   4.809 0.415   
Population 
growth 
1.782     1.938   17.314 -0.300  
Government 
spending 
(in log) 
2.815     0.338    3.416 0.716 
Democracy 
7.168 4.636 10 0.72 
 
For democracy variable, the data are extracted from the freedom house. We measure 
democracy by the combined score of political rights and civil liberties of a country. Thus, 
democracy index ranges from 2 to 14. The higher the score, the more it there's a great 
democracy. According to Freedom House, countries with a score less than 5.5 are classified as 
"free" or "partially free" and the countries that have a higher score than 5, 5, these are referred 
to as "not free". 
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For control variables, we choose to include in our model, the trade openness ratio (in 
logarithm), the initial GDP per capita (in logarithm), the rate of population, Human capital 
approximated by the rate of primary school enrollment (in logarithm), life expectancy (in 
logarithm), and government spending (in logarithm). Indeed, according to some theoretical 
and empirical studies, these variables are important determinants of economic growth. Data of 
these variables are taken from the World Development indicators (2012). 
For the trade openness, many theoretical and empirical studies have shown the 
positive impact of openness and integration of the economies in world trade on economic 
growth. Indeed, trade liberalization has positive effects on economic growth as the transfer 
and development of technology. In addition, trade stimulates cross-border learning of 
production methods allowing a better allocation of domestic resources. 
 
Concerning the initial GDP per capita, the neoclassical theory states that, given the 
diminishing returns to capital, rich countries should grow less rapidly than poor countries. 
For the variable life expectancy, economists argue that more health workers improves, 
the more they can work long hours without succumbing to disease and then allows for high 
productivity. 
Government spending can have a negative effect on economic growth because they 
entail high levels of taxation that discourages private investors. In addition, through public 
consumption, there's a transfer of resources from the private to the public sector, while most 
economists believe that the private sector allocates the resources more efficient than the 
public sector. 
 For the variable population growth, it can retard economic growth. Indeed, the higher 
the rate of population growth is high, and more the number of new workers entering the labor 
market serve to dilute the total capital per worker. Indeed, for a given level of investment, 
each worker will have less capital stock which leads to lower economic productivity levels. 
 
Human capital is approximated by the primary school enrollment rate. The theory of 
endogenous growth provides a positive effect of human capital on economic growth in the 
long term.  
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3.2. Methodology and Model 
          
 We study first the impact of corruption on growth taking into account the interactive effect 
corruption-democracy for democratic and non democratic countries. We conduct a dynamic 
panel data for more than 40 countries over the period 2000- 2011 by estimating the following 
model: 
 
tiiititittitit
democracycorruptionCXCDemocracyCcorruptionCYCCY    )*.(... 5432110
   1                                             
Where 
itY  is the real GDP (in logarithm) of the country i  at time t . 
itCorrupt  is the index of corruption of the country i  at time t . 
itX  is a vector of control variables which are considered as determinants of economic growth 
in the literature. 
- Open  is the trade openness rate (in logarithm). 
- Primary school enrollment (in logarithm) (Ln PS). 
 
- Government spending (in logarithm). 
- Life expectancy (in logarithm). 
- Population rate. 
- Initial GDP per capita. 
itDemocracy is democracy index of country i  at time t . 
i  is a country specific effect 
it  is an error term. 
 
Second, we separate the data into two models. A model that includes only non-democratic 
countries and a model including the democratic countries and explore the effects of corruption 
on economic growth by estimating the following model: 
 
tiiitittitit
XCDemocracyCcorruptionCYCCY    ... 432110   2  
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We utilize the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques. The 
method of GMM system will be used. Its consistency depends on the validity of the 
instruments. The specification test that is considered to study this question is the test of 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen test). The second one is the AR(1) Arellano- Bond test of 
absence of second order serial correlation. 
 
3.3. Empirical results 
 
We report results for over 40 countries for the period 2000 to 2011. To test the 
differences between the non-democratic and democratic countries, we first tested the 
interactive effect between democracy and corruption. This allows us to compare the impact of 
corruption on growth in democratic countries versus those who are undemocratic. We then 
separate the data into two models. A model that includes only non-democratic countries and a 
model including the democratic countries. This approach provides a more intuitive way to see 
the differential effects on corruption democratic and non-democratic regimes. The results are 
summarized in tables below. 
In overall, the models (interaction, non-democracies, and democracies) using GMM 
(sys) estimation. In all regressions, the Hansen statistics indicate that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, H0: Over-identifying restrictions are valid. So, the instrument variables used in the 
GMM estimation in our model are appropriate. The serial correlation test AR (1) Arellano- 
Bond also accepts the null hypothesis of absence of first order serial correlation. 
In Table 2 (regression 2), we present our results for the interactive effect democracy-
corruption (for democratic and non democratic countries). The estimation results confirm our 
thesis that democracy reduces the negative impact of corruption on economic growth. Indeed, 
the results of the estimation of the model show that a one point increase in the level of 
corruption has the effect of reducing economic growth by nearly - 0.011 point and an increase 
in the level of democracy of a point has the effect of increasing the economic growth of 0.11 
points. These results indicate that corruption is a drag on economic performance and that 
democracy can mitigate the negative effects of corruption on economic growth. 
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Table 2. Impact of corruption on economic growth in Democratic and non Democratic 
Countries 
                                     
Variables (1) (2) 
  Democracy/Corruption 
interaction 
Ln yit-1 
1.008
*** 
 (0.008) 
1.005
***
 
(0.004) 
Corruption 
-0.0113
*
    
(0.006) 
 
-0.011 
*
 
(0.006) 
Democracy 
0.008
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Democracy/Corruption 
interaction 
_ 
0.0015
*
 
(0.0008) 
Ln open 
0.029
***
   
(0.011) 
0.0175
**
 
(0.008) 
Ln PS 
0.023   
 (0.020) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
 
population -0.003
***
    
(0.001) 
-0.0026
**
 
(0.0012) 
Ln Government spending -0.022
*
 
0.014 
-0.037
***
 
(0.011) 
Ln life expectancy -0.231 
0.139 
-0.153 
(0.101) 
 
Ln initial GDP/capita 
0.037
**
 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Constant 0.300 
(0.273) 
0.516 
(0.325) 
Observations 
364 361 
AR(1) P Value 
0.006 0.009 
Hansen Test P Value 
0.261 0.250 
 
                    Source: Author  calculations, 
                      *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Std error are in parentheses. 
 
 
As an alternative test, in Tables 3 and 4, we present the estimation results for the non-
democratic and democratic countries separately. In non-democratic countries (Table 3), the 
results show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is negative and significant 
showing that corruption has a deleterious effect on economic performance in these countries. 
However, the results reported in the table 4 show that in democratic countries, economic 
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growth is not affected by corruption. Indeed, the coefficient of corruption is negative but 
insignificant. For both samples of countries, we find that democracy has a positive and 
significant effect on economic growth. This supports the thesis that democracy reduces the 
negative effects of any level of corruption. 
 
Table 3. Impact of corruption on economic growth in non Democratic Countries 
                                     
Variables (1) (2) 
   
Ln yit-1 
1.007
*** 
(0.005) 
  1.028
***
 
(0.025) 
 
Corruption 
-0.015
**
 
( 0.008) 
-0.033
*
 
(0.016) 
Democracy _ 
0.0188
*
 
(0.010) 
Ln open 
0.032
***
 
( 0.006) 
0.057
***
 
(0.016) 
Ln PS 
0.013
**
 
(0.005) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
 
population -0.002
*
 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Ln Government spending -0.005 
(0.015) 
0.099 
(0.062) 
Ln lifeexpectancy -0.143 
(0.099) 
-0.304 
(0.275) 
Ln initial GDP/capita 
0.019
**
 
(0.008) 
0.046
*
 
(0.022) 
Constant 0.191 
(0.230) 
-0.413 
(0.589) 
Observations 
186 186 
AR(1) P Value 
0.074 0.001 
Hansen Test P Value 
0.429 0.530 
 
                    Source: Author  calculations, 
                      *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Std error are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Impact of corruption on economic growth in Democratic Countries 
                                     
Variables (1) (2) 
   
Ln yit-1 
1.020
***
 
(0.009) 
0.999
***
 
(0.012) 
Corruption 
-0.007   
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
 
Democracy _ 
0.194
*
 
(0.109) 
Ln open 
0.055
**
 
(0.021) 
0.130
**
 
(0.059) 
Ln PS 
-0.446 
(0.346) 
-0.095 
(0.323) 
 
Ln lifeexpectancy 0.199 
(0.349) 
-1.984
***
 
(0.589) 
population -0.009 
(0.01 ) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
Ln Government spending 0.020 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.063) 
Ln initial GDP/capita 
0.071 
**
 
(0.026) 
0.0751
*
 
(0.037) 
Constant 0.442 
(1.39) 
7.458
***
 
(2.483) 
Observations 
188 188 
AR(1) P Value 
0.016 0.067 
Hansen Test P Value 
0.352 0.202 
 
                    Source: Author  calculations, 
                      *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Std error are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
                  
Among the possible explanations for the absence of significative effect of corruption on economic 
growth in democratic countries. The first is that the effects are simply due to the small variation 
 in corruption to democratic countries. If the independent variable has a small variation or almost no 
vary, this variable  has no effect on growth. However, corruption varies considerably in democratic 
countries and varies even more than in authoritarian regimes. In fact, the standard deviation of 
corruption in democratic regimes is 1.518 and only 1,306 in authoritarian regimes (See appendix B 
Table B.1 and B.2). 
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Another more subtle possibility is that despite the high variability of corruption in democratic 
countries, it may be sufficient enough corruption in any democracy to significantly reduce economic 
growth, and therefore there is no way falsifying our hypothesis. However, in many democratic 
countries, corruption levels are relatively high (Greece, Italy, Hungary, Spain). In these countries, the 
level of corruption during the study period is greater or equal than to the average level of corruption in 
authoritarian regimes. Thus, there is a lot of data to falsify our hypothesis. 
 
Our main objective in this analysis is to demonstrate that democracy reduces the negative 
effects of corruption on economic growth, but it is also useful to discuss the effects that can have the 
control variables that are important determinants of economic growth. It should also be noted that the 
implementation of all the variables in common generally made some insignificant control variables, if 
we do not necessarily expect all significant control variables. It is primarily for this reason it is 
interesting to examine what were the variables most robust control in this analysis. 
The coefficient of trade openness is positive and significant showing its positive impact on 
economic growth. This confirms many theoretical and empirical studies showing the positive impact 
of openness and integration of the economies in world trade on economic growth. Indeed, trade 
liberalization has positive effects on economic growth as the transfer and development of technology. 
In addition, trade stimulates cross-border learning of production methods allowing a better allocation 
of domestic resources. 
Measuring human capital approximated by the primary school enrollment rate has 
positive and significant coefficient in most cases. This result confirms the theory of 
endogenous growth that provides a positive effect of human capital on economic growth in 
the long term. 
The neoclassical growth theory predicts that the initial GDP has a negative effect on growth, 
reflecting the diminishing returns to capital in rich countries. However, our results generally show a 
positive effect or non-significant effect of this variable on economic growth.  
Economists also argue that public spending hurts growth by taking resources away from the 
private sector (effective) and place them inside the (less efficient) public sector (Barro, 1997). Our 
results confirm this prediction. Indeed, our results show a negative and significant effect of 
Government spending on economic growth. 
 
Concerning the population variable, the latter has a negative and significant effect on 
economic growth in most cases. This sign is expected, in fact the more people is high, the 
higher it impedes economic growth.  
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Finally, the life expectancy generally facilitates economic growth, but our results 
showed insignificant sign in most cases. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Through some theoretical and empirical studies, economists have shown that democracy and 
corruption are political process important for economic growth. The majority of empirical studies on 
the effect of corruption on economic growth show that corruption has a detrimental effect on growth 
and most empirical studies on democracy test its direct effect on economic growth. Like Drury and al. 
(2006) through this study, we have shown that the relationship between growth, corruption and 
democracy is more complex. Thus, we tried to show through our results that the negative effect of 
corruption is damped by the political process in which the corruption occurs, and that democracy is 
beneficial in the sense that it allows to mitigate or reduce the adverse effects of corruption. To 
understand the political effects of corruption, it is necessary to take into account the political context 
in which the corruption occurs. Thus, for example capacity in democratic country voters to withdraw 
its bureau chiefs appeared to mitigate the negative impact of corruption retards economic growth. 
Although most democratic countries in our sample have a high levels of corruption, their leaders 
should refrain from corruption on growth achieved lest they be punished in the next election. We 
argue that the electoral mechanism inhibits corruption democratic countries to have an impact on their 
economies. 
Finally, our results shed light on the relationship between politics and economic growth. Our results 
show as some empirical work that usually political factors are important determinants of economic 
growth. In addition, our results suggest that democracy has another advantage to recommend 
mitigating the negative effects of corruption on growth. Thus, the fact that some countries are victims 
of corruption, promote democracy within them can not only improve their human rights in general, but 
their chance of prosperity. Given the importance of democracy in the improvement of human rights 
and mitigating the negative effects of corruption on economic growth, most of governments must 
promoting democracy for more prosperity luck. 
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APPENDIX A 
A.1 List of non democratic countries 
1. Lebanon 
2. Iran 
3. Soudan 
4. Kuwait 
5. Saudi Arabia 
6. Bahrain 
7. Yemen 
8. Oman 
9. Mauritania 
10. Syria 
11. Jordan 
12. Egypt 
13. Algeria 
14. Morocco 
15. Tunisia  
16. United Arab Emirates 
17. Angola 
18. Cameroon 
19. Chad 
20. China 
21. Kazakhastan 
22. Kenya 
23. Pakistan 
24. Zimbabwe 
A.2 List of democratic countries 
1. Australia 
2. Belgium 
3. Canada 
4. Denmark 
5. Finland 
6. France 
7. Germany 
8. Greece 
9. Hungary 
10. Iceland 
11. Ireland 
12. Italy 
13. Japan 
14. Luxembourg 
15. Spain 
16. New Zeland 
17. Sweden 
18. United Kingdom 
19 
 
19. United states 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B. Summary Statistics 
 
Table B.1. Summary Statistics (for democratic countries) 
Variables Mean Standard deviation     
Deviation 
Maximum  Minimum 
     
GDP 26.958     1.657    
 
30.235 
 
23.304    
Corruption index 7.749    1.518        
 
10 
 
4.2          
Life expectancy  
( 
(in log) 
4.374    0.026   4.418 4.266  
Trade openness 
(in log) 
4.292    0.597    5.834 3.100   
InitialGDP/capita 
(in log) 
10.367    0.413   11.189 9.083   
Human capital 
(in log) 
 
 
 
4.626     0.031   4.710 4.560   
Population 
growth 
0.716    0.613  2.530 -0.286  
Government 
spending 
(in log) 
3.012     0.163   3.394 2.658    
Democracy 
 
2.178   0.404  4 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2 Summary Statistics (for non democratic countries) 
Variables Mean Standard deviation     
Deviation 
Maximum  Minimum 
     
20 
 
GDP 24.415    1.490  
 
29.140 
 
21.278    
Corruption index 3.286     1.306        
 
6.8 
 
0.72         
Life expectancy  
( 
(in log) 
4.182     0.158    4.376 3.758  
Trade openness 
(in log) 
4.304     4,762 5.704 2.519    
InitialGDP/capita 
(in log) 
7.655    1.332             10.735 
 
5.680    
Human capital 
(in log) 
 
 
 
4.559835     0.402 4.809 0.415   
Population 
growth 
2.626     2.197  17.314 -0.300   
Government 
spending 
(in log) 
2.651     0.358    3.416 0.716   
DEMOCRACY       
11.118       1.735           14 6          
 
 
 
     
     
 
 
